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ASKING THE RIGHT FEDERAL 
QUESTIONS: MERRILL LYNCH V. 
MANNING AND THE EXCLUSIVE 
JURISDICTION PROVISION OF THE 
SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT 
SETH TAYLOR* 
INTRODUCTION 
Suppose you run a small corporation in the business of auctioneering 
stamps, coins, and other collectibles. Sensing that your corporation’s 
financial prospects are on the decline, large financial institutions drive the 
price of the company’s stock down. Your shareholders sue in state court 
alleging a breach of state law in manipulating stock prices while also 
referencing breaches of federal securities law. 
Can the defendant financial institutions remove the case to federal 
court? This question is set to be answered by the Supreme Court in 
Manning v. Merrill Lynch,1 which deals specifically with whether section 
27 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act)2 allows 
defendants to remove a case to federal court when the plaintiff brings state-
law claims in state court, but references violations of a related federal 
regulation. 
Federal question jurisdiction is a murky yet vital area of the law. It 
impacts the remedies and defenses available to litigants and touches on the 
balance between the federal and state court systems, and sometimes has 
implications for the federal-state balance in complex regulatory 
frameworks, such as the financial regulatory system. And significantly, the 
Court’s stance on this issue has implications beyond the world of securities 
regulation insofar as the Natural Gas Act and Federal Power Act have 
exclusive jurisdiction provisions that are essentially identical to that in 
* J.D. Candidate, Duke University School of Law, Class of 2017.
1. Manning v. Merrill Lynch Pierce Fenner & Smith, Inc., 772 F.3d 158, 160 (3d Cir. 2014),
cert. granted, 135 S. Ct. 2938 (2015). 
2. 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (2012).
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federal securities law.3 
In Manning, the Supreme Court has an opportunity to resolve several 
circuit splits at once by deciding how the removal provisions of section 27 
should be construed relative to the general federal question jurisdiction 
statute.4 More specifically, Manning presents two important issues: First, 
whether section 1331 is coterminous with section 27 of the Exchange Act, 
so that the requirements of section 1331 must be met before section 27 will 
operate to divest state courts of jurisdiction, and second, if section 1331 is 
not coterminous with section 27, whether section 27 can serve as an 
independent basis for exercising jurisdiction here. 
This Commentary urges the Court to hold that the requirement of 
section 1331—that a claim in federal court “arises under” federal law—is a 
necessary prerequisite to the triggering of any exclusive jurisdiction 
provision. This holding would prevent wholly state-law claims brought in 
state court from being removed to federal court, thereby preserving the 
federal-state balance that Congress intended to create through the Exchange 
Act. 
I.  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
Greg Manning is a shareholder in Escala Group (Escala), a company 
that auctioneered stamps and other collectibles.5 Alleging that certain 
financial institutions, including Merrill Lynch, engaged in naked short-
selling in Escala stock, Manning and other shareholders brought a number 
of state-law claims in New Jersey state court.6 Specifically, the 
shareholders sued for violations of the New Jersey Racketeer Influenced 
and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act based on predicate state offenses, as 
well as for breach of contract and unjust enrichment, among other claims.7 
The distinction between short sales and naked short sales is critical in 
Manning v. Merrill Lynch. A normal short sale—an attempt to profit from a 
future decrease in the price of a stock—involves a number of steps: 
The short seller identifies securities she believes will drop in market 
price, borrows these securities from a broker (prime brokers have the 
 
 3.  Brief for Petitioners at 26, Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Manning, No. 14-
1132 (U.S. Mar. 27, 2015) [hereinafter Brief for Petitioners] (“Further, as discussed above, the 
jurisdictional issue here is not limited to § 27, but applies equally to the [Natural Gas Act] and the 
[Federal Power Act].”). 
 4.  28 U.S.C. § 1331 is the general federal question jurisdiction statute. 
 5.  Manning, 772 F.3d at 160. 
 6.  Id. 
 7.  Id. 
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greatest market share), sells the borrowed securities on the open market, 
purchases replacement securities on the open market, and returns them 
to the broker—thereby closing the short seller’s position. The short 
seller’s profit (if any) is the difference between the market price at 
which she sold the borrowed securities and the market price at which 
she purchased the replacement securities, less borrowing fees, 
brokerage fees, interest, and any other charges levied by the broker.8 
In contrast, in a naked short sale, “the short seller does not borrow 
securities in time to make delivery to the buyer within the standard three-
day settlement period. As a result, the seller fails to deliver securities to the 
buyer when delivery is due (known as a ‘fail’ or ‘fail to deliver’).”9 
Although there are several causes of naked short sales, the naked short 
sale in Manning was allegedly “part of a scheme to manipulate the price of 
a security.”10 And although naked short sales are not necessarily illegal 
under federal law, “some naked short selling schemes may run afoul of 
federal antifraud laws, as well as Regulation SHO.”11 Using its authority 
under the Exchange Act, the Securities and Exchange Commission adopted 
Regulation SHO12 in 2004 to impose certain restrictions on short sales in an 
effort to limit naked short sales.13 
Regulation SHO is vital in Manning because the defendants’ efforts to 
establish federal question jurisdiction depend on references to that 
regulation in the complaint. Although the plaintiffs brought only state-law 
claims against the defendants, “the Amended Complaint repeatedly 
mentions the requirements of Regulation SHO, its background, and 
enforcement actions taken against some Defendants regarding Regulation 
SHO.”14 In fact, “there is no question that [the shareholders] assert in their 
Amended Complaint, both expressly and by implication, that Defendants 
repeatedly violated federal law. Moreover, there is no New Jersey analogue 
to Regulation SHO.”15 Thus, in the view of the financial institutions, these 
references to Regulation SHO are crucial: They indicate that the plaintiffs 
are seeking to enforce a federal duty, thereby generating federal question 
 
 8.  Elec. Trading Grp. v. Banc of Am. Sec., 588 F.3d 128, 132 (2d Cir. 2009). 
 9.  Manning, 772 F.3d at 161 (quoting Amendments to Regulation SHO, Exchange Act Release 
No. 34-58774, 73 Fed. Reg. 61666, 61667 (Oct. 14, 2008)). 
 10.  Id. (citing Amendments to Regulation SHO, Exchange Act Release No. 34-58774, 73 Fed. 
Reg. 61666, 61667  (Oct. 14, 2008)). 
 11.  Id. 
 12.  17 CFR §§ 242.200–242.204t (2015). 
 13.  Manning, 772 F.3d at 161. 
 14.  Id. 
 15.  Id. 
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jurisdiction.16 
Based on this theory, Merrill Lynch and the financial institutions 
removed the case from the state court to the United States District Court for 
the District of New Jersey.17 The shareholders moved for a remand to the 
state court, and the magistrate judge, finding that the shareholders could 
succeed on their state-law claims without establishing a violation of 
Regulation SHO, issued a recommendation to the district court in support 
of the plaintiffs’ motion to remand.18 The district court, however, rejected 
this recommendation and refused to remand, finding that the shareholders’ 
success on the state-law claims hinged on their proving a violation of 
Regulation SHO.19 The district court then certified an interlocutory appeal 
on the question of federal question jurisdiction.20 
The Third Circuit reversed the district court, finding that Regulation 
SHO was not an element of any of the shareholders’ claims.21 As a result, 
because “[section] 1331 does not provide a basis to exercise jurisdiction 
over [the shareholders’] claims,” the court held there was no federal 
question jurisdiction.22 The court found that section 27 of the Exchange 
Act—an exclusive jurisdiction provision for claims brought to vindicate a 
right created by the Exchange Act—would only apply if the claims met the 
requirements of section 1331.23 Specifically, it held that “[section] 27 is 
coextensive with [section] 1331 for purposes of establishing subject-matter 
jurisdiction.”24 As a result, “the exclusive jurisdiction provision merely 
serves to divest state courts of jurisdiction. Accordingly, section 27 does 
not provide an independent basis to exercise jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ 
claims.”25 Following this decision, the defendants petitioned for a writ of 
certiorari from the Supreme Court of the United States which was granted 
on June 30, 2015.26 
 
 16.  Brief for Petitioners, supra note 3, at 15 (“As both lower courts concluded and as [the 
shareholders] did not dispute, [their] complaint repeatedly alleges that [Merrill Lynch] violated 
Regulation SHO, a regulation promulgated under the Exchange Act. Those allegations suffice to confer 
federal jurisdiction under the statute’s plain text.”). 
 17.  Manning, 772 F.3d at 161. 
 18.  Id. at 161–62. 
 19.  Id. at 162. 
 20.  Id. 
 21.  Id. at 163. 
 22.  Id. at 165. 
 23.  Id. at 167–68. 
 24.  Id. 
 25.  Id. 
 26.  Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Manning, 135 S. Ct. 2938 (2015). 
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II. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
As a constitutional matter, Article III of the U.S. Constitution allows 
federal courts to exercise jurisdiction over “all cases, in law and equity, 
arising under this Constitution, the laws of the United States, and treaties 
made, or which shall be made, under their authority.”27 Similarly, the 
general federal question jurisdiction statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1331, provides 
that “district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions 
arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.”28 
However, section 1331 jurisdiction is more limited than the Constitution 
itself allows.29 Thus, under section 1331, a state-law claim must include a 
federal ingredient as a necessary component in order for federal question 
jurisdiction to be found, even though the Constitution itself would allow for 
significantly broader federal jurisdiction.30 
The extent of federal jurisdiction under section 1331 is not at issue in 
Manning v. Merrill Lynch. If it were, the court would apply the test laid out 
in Grable & Sons Metal Products v. Darue Engineering & 
Manufacturing,31 which stipulates that federal question jurisdiction “over a 
state law claim will lie if a federal issue is: (1) necessarily raised, (2) 
actually disputed, (3) substantial, and (4) capable of resolution in federal 
court without disrupting the federal-state balance approved by Congress.”32 
Applying the test, the Third Circuit found that no federal issue was 
necessarily raised, and that issue has not been raised on appeal.33 
Thus, rather than the proper application of Grable, the most important 
legal questions in Manning are: (1) Whether section 1331 is coterminous 
with section 27 of the Exchange Act, so that the requirements of section 
1331 must be met before section 27 will operate to divest state courts of 
jurisdiction, and (2) If section 1331 is not coterminous with section 27, 
whether the requirements of section 27 have been met here. 
 
 27.  U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. 
 28.  28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2012). 
 29.  Compare Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824) (constitutional 
limits on federal subject matter jurisdiction) with Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 
149 (1908) (statutory limits on federal subject matter jurisdiction). 
 30.  Brief for Respondents at 24, Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Manning, (No. 
14-1132) (U.S. Oct. 23, 2015) [hereinafter Brief for Respondents] (noting that “federal jurisdiction 
requires that the federal ingredient be a necessary component of a state-law claim.”). 
 31.  545 U.S. 308 (2005). 
 32.  Manning, 772 F.3d at 163. 
 33.  Id. (“Because we conclude that no federal issue has been necessarily raised here, we need not 
decide whether the other three Grable requirements are met.”). 
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A.  Is Section 1331 Coterminous with Section 27 of the Exchange Act? 
There is a significant circuit split over whether the requirements of 
section 1331 must be met before section 27 will create federal question 
jurisdiction over a state-law claim.34 In deciding the answer, courts have 
largely focused on a Supreme Court decision interpreting the jurisdictional 
provision of the Natural Gas Act.35 The jurisdictional provision in section 
27 of the Exchange Act is essentially identical to the one in the Natural Gas 
Act.36 
Pan American involved a contract dispute between producers of natural 
gas and their buyer, a natural gas pipeline company.37 The contracts at issue 
stipulated the prices at which the pipeline company would buy the natural 
gas, but “a state commission subsequently issued an order fixing the 
minimum price for gas above the prices originally agreed to by the 
contracting parties.”38 The state commission’s order was eventually 
overturned, but the pipeline company had paid the natural gas producers at 
the above-contract-price minimum rate, so it brought breach of contract 
claims in Delaware state court in order to regain the money it had paid 
above the contract price.39 
In the defendant gas producers’ view, removal to federal court was 
proper because the parties had filed the contract prices with the federal 
government pursuant to the Natural Gas Act, which implied that the 
plaintiffs were trying to enforce a duty created by the Natural Gas Act—the 
duty to charge the rates that were filed, no more and no less.40 Eventually, 
the case reached the Supreme Court, which held there was no general 
federal question jurisdiction because, as a suit for breach of contract, it was 
based on state rather than federal law.41 
Going further, the Court held that the exclusive jurisdiction provision 
of the Natural Gas Act did not operate as an independent basis of federal 
jurisdiction because “‘[e]xclusive jurisdiction’ is given [to] the federal 
 
 34.  The Second Circuit has held that the jurisdictional requirement of section 1331 is coterminous 
with section 27. See Barbara v. N.Y. Stock Exch., Inc., 99 F.3d 49, 55 (2d Cir. 1996). The Ninth 
Circuit, on the other hand, has held that section 27 provides an independent basis for federal 
jurisdication. See Cal. ex rel. Lockyer v. Dynegy, Inc., 375 F.3d 831, 841 (9th Cir. 2004). 
 35.  Pan American Petrol. Corp. v. Super. Ct. of Del., 366 U.S. 656 (1961). 
 36.  Brief for Respondents, supra note 30, at 39. 
 37.  Brief of Amici Curiae Nat. Gas Supply Ass’n at 17, Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 
Inc. v. Manning, No 14-1132 (U.S. Sept. 10, 2015). 
 38.  Id. 
 39.  Id. 
 40.  Id. (“The natural gas producers argued that, if the former, the claims were subject to the 
‘exclusive jurisdiction’ provision of the Natural Gas Act.”) 
 41.  Pan Am. Petroleum Corp. v. Super. Ct. of Del., 366 U.S. 656, 663 (1961). 
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courts but it is ‘exclusive’ only for suits that may be brought in the federal 
courts. Exclusiveness is a consequence of having jurisdiction, not the 
generator of jurisdiction because of which state courts are excluded.”42 In 
effect, the Court indicated that the requirements of section 1331 must be 
satisfied before the exclusive jurisdiction provision could be triggered.43 
And this is the case even though the exclusive jurisdiction provision of the 
Natural Gas Act does not use the term “arising under,” which Congress 
often uses to signal the applicability of section 1331 analysis.44 Thus, Pan 
American suggests that section 1331 must be satisfied before an exclusive 
jurisdiction provision will operate to divest state courts of jurisdiction. 
Nevertheless, courts have disagreed on the applicability of Pan 
American to cases involving the exclusive jurisdiction provision of the 
Exchange Act. The Third Circuit and the Second Circuit have both held 
that section 1331 must be satisfied for the exclusive jurisdiction provision 
of the Exchange Act to be triggered.45 On the other side, the Ninth Circuit 
has distinguished Pan American and held that the exclusive jurisdiction 
provision of the Exchange Act is an independent basis of jurisdiction.46 
B.  Is Section 27 an Applicable, Independent Source of Federal 
Jurisdiction? 
Assuming that section 27 is an independent grant of jurisdiction, the 
parties in Manning still disagree over whether the requirements of section 
27 are actually met. Section 27 provides in relevant part: 
The district courts of the United States and the United States courts of 
any Territory or other place subject to the jurisdiction of the United 
States shall have exclusive jurisdiction of violations of this chapter or 
the rules and regulations thereunder, and of all suits in equity and 
actions at law brought to enforce any liability or duty created by this 
chapter or the rules and regulations thereunder.47 
Thus, by bringing state-law claims that reference a federal regulation 
adopted pursuant to the Exchange Act, are the plaintiffs seeking either to 
recover from a violation of the Exchange Act or to enforce a “liability or 
 
 42.  Id. at 664. 
 43.  See id. 
 44.  See id. at 665 n.2. 
 45.  Manning v. Merrill Lynch Pierce Fenner & Smith, Inc., 772 F.3d 158, 167 (3d Cir. 2014) 
(“We agree with the Second Circuit’s holding in Barbara that § 27 is coextensive with § 1331 for 
purposes of establishing subject-matter jurisdiction—the exclusive jurisdiction provision merely serves 
to divest state courts of jurisdiction.”). 
 46.  California ex rel. Lockyer v. Dynegy, Inc., 375 F.3d 831, 843 n.10 (9th Cir. 2004). 
 47.  Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa(a) (2012). 
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duty created by [the Act]?”48 
The Supreme Court addressed this question in Matsushita  Electric 
Industrial Co. v. Epstein.49 In that case, shareholder-plaintiffs challenged a 
merger through state-law claims filed in Delaware state court, and later 
through federal claims based on violations of section 27 in federal court.50 
Eventually, the defendant won the federal case, and while that was on 
appeal, the parties in state court settled, agreeing that those who did not opt 
out would waive all claims, including those asserted in the California 
federal action.51 The Supreme Court received the case on appeal from the 
Ninth Circuit, and held that: 
While [Section] 27 prohibits state courts from adjudicating claims 
arising under the Exchange Act, it does not prohibit state courts from 
approving the release of Exchange Act claims in the settlement of suits 
over which they have properly exercised jurisdiction, i.e., suits arising 
under state law or under federal law for which there is concurrent 
jurisdiction. In this case, for example, the Delaware action was not 
“brought to enforce” any rights or obligations under the Act.52 
Thus, in Matsushita, the Court gave deference to the state courts’ 
resolution of the claims, despite the fact that section 27 could have been 
read broadly to preclude the state court from resolving those claims. 
However, the Court also noted that “Congress intended [Section] 27 to 
serve at least the general purposes underlying most grants of exclusive 
jurisdiction: ‘to achieve greater uniformity of construction and more 
effective and expert application of that law.’”53 This reasoning favors the 
defendant financial institutions in Manning because this purpose of section 
27—greater uniformity in financial regulation—would be most easily 
realized by allowing for total federal jurisdiction whenever a federal issue 
is potentially broached, thereby shutting out state courts and preventing 
departures from the federal interpretation. As a result, Matsushita gives 
both sides in Manning ammunition to argue that their interpretation of 
section 27 is correct, whether broad (to grant federal question jurisdiction 
over plaintiffs’ claims) or narrow (to keep the way to federal court shut). 
 
 48.  Id. 
 49.  516 U.S. 367 (1996). 
 50.  Id. at 370. 
 51.  Id. at 370–71. 
 52.  Id. at 381. 
 53.  Id. at 383 (quoting Murphy v. Gallagher, 761 F.2d 878, 885 (2d Cir. 1985)). 
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III.  HOLDING 
The Third Circuit began its decision in Manning v. Merrill Lynch by 
assessing whether the “arising under” standard set forth in section 1331 
was met.54 The court stated that although the plaintiffs’ complaint alleged 
only state-law claims, “[t]here is no question that Plaintiffs assert in their 
Amended Complaint, both expressly and by implication, that Defendants 
repeatedly violated federal law.”55 Nevertheless, the court held that 
“Regulation SHO is not an element of any of Plaintiffs’ claims. The claims, 
therefore, could be decided without reference to federal law.”56 And 
because federal law was not “necessarily raised,” the plaintiffs’ claims 
failed to “arise under” section 1331, per the test set forth in Grable & Sons 
Metal Products v. Darue Engineering & Manufacturing.57 
By contrast, the district court had found that a federal issue was 
necessarily raised because New Jersey law does not expressly regulate 
short sales, so “the claims were necessarily predicated on the violation of 
Regulation SHO.”58 The Third Circuit subsequently overruled the district 
court on this point, concluding that New Jersey could interpret the general 
antifraud provisions in its state law—which the plaintiffs claimed had been 
violated—more broadly, so that fraud for the purposes of New Jersey state 
law encompassed the naked short sales at issue in Manning.59 
Next, the Third Circuit considered whether section 27 of the Exchange 
Act “might nonetheless provide a more expansive basis for federal-question 
jurisdiction” through its exclusive jurisdiction provision.60 After noting the 
circuit split on the issue, the Third Circuit wrote that “the Supreme Court 
all but answered this question” in Pan American Petroleum Corp. v. 
Superior Court of Delaware.61 Relying on the Supreme Court’s holding that 
in the Natural Gas Act, exclusive jurisdiction “is given the federal courts 
but it is ‘exclusive’ only for suits that may be brought in the federal 
courts,”62 the Third Circuit held that section 27 of the Exchange Act will 
only be triggered if the federal courts already have federal question 
jurisdiction under section 1331.63 
 
 54.  Manning v. Merrill Lynch Pierce Fenner & Smith, Inc., 772 F.3d 158, 163 (3d Cir. 2014). 
 55.  Id. at 161. 
 56.  Id. at 163. 
 57.  Id. 
 58.  Id. 
 59.  Id. 
 60.  Id. at 165, 66. 
 61.  Id. at 166. 
 62.  Id. (quoting Pan Am. Petrol. Corp. v. Super. Ct. of Del., 366 U.S. 656, 664 (1961)). 
 63.  Id. at 167. 
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IV.  ARGUMENTS 
There are two key legal issues in Manning v. Merrill Lynch. First, 
whether section 1331 must be satisfied before federal courts can gain 
exclusive jurisdiction over the claims under section 27. And second, if 
section 1331 does not have to be satisfied for section 27 to apply, whether 
section 27 actually covers the claims at issue here. 
A.  The Shareholders’ Arguments 
In keeping with the Third Circuit’s decision, the shareholders argue that 
their claims must satisfy the requirements of section 1331 before section 27 
will create federal jurisdiction over them.64 In the shareholder’s words, the 
view of the financial institutions constitutes a “monumental departure from 
the traditional rules of federal jurisdiction. It is a bedrock presumption that 
state-law claims must (at a minimum) necessarily raise a federal issue to 
create jurisdiction.”65 The shareholders cite Pan American Petroleum Corp. 
v. Superior Court of Delaware, in which the Supreme Court concluded that 
“the meaning of ‘brought to enforce any liability or duty created’ was no 
broader than the meaning of ‘arising under’ in 28 U.S.C. § 1331.”66 
In addition, the shareholders argue that, even if section 1331 need not 
be satisfied to trigger section 27, the plain text of section 27 does not cover 
the state-law claims at issue here. Specifically, they argue that “Section 27 
is textually limited to suits brought to enforce liabilities and duties ‘created 
by [the Exchange Act],’ not liabilities and duties created by state law. A suit 
asserting claims under state law, invoking state-created rights and remedies, 
is not a suit brought to enforce federal law.”67 Thus, the shareholders argue 
that because they are seeking to enforce liabilities created by New Jersey 
state law, section 27 is inapplicable. 
Additionally, the shareholders argue that the historical context of 
securities regulation and policy implications of allowing federal 
jurisdiction over purely state-law claims should guide the Court’s analysis. 
In particular, the plaintiffs emphasize the role historically played by states 
in securities regulation, as it was against the “backdrop of established state 
regulation that Congress passed the Securities Act of 1933 . . . and the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934.”68  
 
 64.  Brief for Respondents, supra note 30, at 26 n.18. 
 65.  Id. at 46. 
 66.  Id. at 39 (quoting Pan Am. Petrol. Corp. v. Super. Ct. of Del., 366 U.S. 656, 665 n.2 (1961)). 
 67.  Id. at 31. 
 68.  Id. at 4. 
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And later, Congress stripped states of jurisdiction over all federal 
securities class actions when it passed the Securities Litigation Uniform 
Standards Act of 1998 (SLUSA), but SLUSA notably did not “preempt all 
state laws prohibiting fraud or market manipulation in connection with 
federally regulated securities.”69 Thus, Congress must have wanted those 
state-law actions to be available in state court, because SLUSA could have 
been written to simply strip states of jurisdiction over all securities cases 
implicating federal issues, rather than just the class actions.70 In sum, the 
shareholders argue that section 1331 must be satisfied before section 27 of 
the Exchange Act can be triggered, and even if section 27 is triggered, it 
does not cover the state-law claims at issue here, so the shareholders should 
be able to make their state-law claims in a state court without fear of 
removal. 
B.  The Financial Institutions’ Arguments 
In the view of the financial institutions, section 27 stands on its own as 
a jurisdictional grant apart from section 1331, and it clearly applies to the 
shareholders’ complaint, which has, after all, referenced violations of 
Regulation SHO. According to the financial institutions, “if the complaint 
on its face alleges a violation of the Act or its regulations, or seeks to 
enforce a liability or duty created by the Act or its regulations, then federal 
courts have exclusive jurisdiction.”71 Thus, they argue that section 27 
operates as an independent grant of jurisdiction.72 
The financial institutions note that because section 27 includes no 
reference to section 1331, “Section 27’s plain language resolves this 
case.”73 They distinguish Pan American on this front by arguing that the 
Court was really applying an early version of the well-pleaded complaint 
rule—which requires a federal issue to be raised on the face of a well-
pleaded complaint for federal question jurisdiction to be found—because 
after all “the complaint in Pan American alleged state-law contract claims; 
the [Natural Gas Act] was raised only as a defense to those state-law causes 
of action.”74 Further, the financial institutions claim section 27 clearly 
 
 69.  Id. at 7–8 (citing Merrill Lynch Pierce Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71, 87 
(2006)). 
 70.  See id. at 8 (noting that because Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998 does not 
preempt state law, “the dual state-federal regulatory regime contemplated by the Depression-era 
Congress continues to this day.”). 
 71.  Brief for Petitioners, supra note 3, at 2. 
 72.  Id. 
 73.  Id. at 14. 
 74.  Id. at 17. 
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covers the shareholders’ claims here because the complaint alleged 
violations of Regulation SHO, and “nothing in section 27’s language states 
or suggests that jurisdiction attaches only if the Regulation SHO violations 
and duties alleged in the complaint are necessary elements of shareholders’ 
claims.”75 
In addition, the financial institutions argue that policy considerations, 
such as the value of a more uniform and less burdensome regulatory 
framework, support their interpretation of section 27. Specifically, they 
note that establishing section 27 as an independent source of federal 
jurisdiction—so that federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over any 
claim alleging violations of a federal regulation pursuant to section 27—
would further Congress’s goals of uniformity and expertise in application 
by judges, because only federal judges would construe the financial 
regulatory framework.76 
V.  ANALYSIS 
The Court should hold for the shareholders. The text of section 27, read 
by itself, may favor the financial institutions’ arguments regarding the 
applicability of section 1331 insofar as it does not reference that statute. 
However, this is the world of jurisdictional statutes, where an out-of-
context, plain-text reading often says little about the law. After all, “arising 
under” in Article III has a different meaning from “arising under” in section 
1331.77 
In jurisdictional jurisprudence, precedents and considerations of 
federalism do much to inform the text. An empirical analysis of the Roberts 
Court from 2005–2008, for example, shows that statutory interpretation 
cases involving jurisdictional statutes only referenced plain-text arguments 
36% of the time, compared to 58.3% of the time for environmental statutes 
and 54.7% for criminal statutes.78 By contrast, cases involving 
jurisdictional statutes referenced precedent-based arguments 66% of the 
time, compared to 25% for environmental statutes and 26.4% for criminal 
statutes.79 Thus, the Roberts Court appears to favor precedent-based 
 
 75.  Id. at 22. 
 76.  Id. at 5. 
 77.  Compare Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824) (constitutional 
limits on federal subject matter jurisdiction) with Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 
149 (1908) (statutory limits on federal subject matter jurisdiction). 
 78.  Anita S. Krishnakumar, Statutory Interpretation in the Roberts Court’s First Era: An 
Empirical and Doctrinal Analysis, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 221, 283 (2010). 
 79.  Id. at 281. 
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arguments over text-based arguments in the context of jurisdictional 
statutes. 
Ultimately, the precedential considerations weigh strongly in favor of 
the shareholders. After all, the Court in Pan American Petroleum Corp. v. 
Superior Court of Delaware clearly required some sort of analysis under 
section 1331 before the relevant exclusive jurisdiction provision was 
triggered, even if that section 1331 analysis took the form of what later 
became the well-pleaded complaint rule, as the financial institutions 
argue.80 And in any case, considerations of precedent and jurisprudential 
policy indicate that the requirements of section 1331 should be met before 
section 27’s exclusive jurisdiction provision operates, as it “is a bedrock 
presumption that state-law claims must (at a minimum) necessarily raise a 
federal issue to create jurisdiction.”81 To hold otherwise is to force a 
plaintiff like Manning—who has pled only state-law claims, who wants to 
be in a state court to pursue those claims, and who needs to prove no 
violation of any federal rule or regulation to succeed—to be subject to the 
rules and defenses of the federal court system, simply because the 
defendant expects a more favorable outcome there. That result is against 
both precedent and common sense. 
Additionally, the shareholders have the better argument on statutory 
interpretation and policy grounds. The policy argument boils down to a 
conflict between uniformity in regulation and federalism: Should the 
defendants be subject to a more uniform, federal-level regulatory system 
even though the plaintiffs only pled claims established by the New Jersey 
state legislature?82 As a matter of statutory interpretation, the federalism 
concerns should outweigh any perceived policy need for uniformity. After 
all, Congress clearly envisioned a role for the states even after the passage 
of the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 
given that those laws “largely preserved and supplemented existing state 
authority over the securities markets.”83 
If Congress had wanted to preempt those state laws and grant federal 
courts exclusive jurisdiction over all securities fraud claims, it could have. 
It did not. And more recently, when Congress granted the federal courts 
exclusive jurisdiction over securities fraud class actions through SLUSA, it 
 
 80.  Brief for Petitioners, supra note 3, at 32. 
 81.  Brief for Respondents, supra note 30, at 46. 
 82.  Compare id. at 51–52 (advocating for federalism in favor of denying exclusive jurisdiction) 
with Brief for Petitioners, supra note 3, at 24–25 (advocating for uniformity in favor of finding 
exclusive jurisdiction). 
 83.  Brief for Respondents, supra note 30, at 4. 
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could have extended that exclusive jurisdiction to all securities fraud 
actions.84 It did not, and the Court should not act as if it had by granting 
federal question jurisdiction here. Of course, this is an argument based on 
congressional inaction, but at a certain point (and surely we have passed it), 
repeated congressional inaction over the course of nearly a century in the 
context of a robust federal-state securities regulation system should be read 
for what it is: the conscious incorporation of state law into a complex 
regulatory framework. 
CONCLUSION 
Corporations, investors, and financial institutions should operate in a 
clear and transparent regulatory environment: Whether a given transaction 
will be regulated by a state or federal regulator should not be a surprise, 
and whether a claim can be brought in a state rather than federal court 
should be equally unsurprising. As of now, this latter issue—whether 
federal question jurisdiction will obtain in a given case—is too often a 
surprise, and a wasteful one insofar as the inquiry requires courts to engage 
in a murky and contested analysis to decide which courts should later hear 
the actual substance of the case. Fortunately, Manning v. Merrill Lynch 
affords the Court an opportunity to set the bounds of federal question 
jurisdiction, so that plaintiffs and defendants in cases potentially involving 
exclusive jurisdiction provisions will know where they can—and cannot—
see each other in court. 
In Manning, the Court will decide a case in which a plaintiff has 
brought state-law claims in a state court, in which no federal issue is 
necessarily raised by the complaint. Federal question jurisdiction is often a 
messy business, but the question can be easily answered here: Section 1331 
should be held to be coterminous with section 27, so that its requirements 
must be satisfied before section 27 will operate. Holding in this way will 
maintain Supreme Court precedent, support the system of federalism in 
securities regulation laid out by Congress, and ensure that federal courts do 
not take the exclusive jurisdiction that Congress could have granted to 
them, but has not. In this case the shareholders want to bring their state-law 
claims in a state court. That should be their right. 
 
 
 84.  Id. at 7–8. 
